Originally Posted by
GlobalNav
Easy, the source selection team found the Airbus superior under the established criteria.
It was politics that nixed the selection.
Again, I'm not going to defend Boeing's performance post award, but that first sentence ain't quite what happened.
Briefly there are two basic kind of awards. The first is Lowest Bid Technically Acceptable. They're quite handy for many non-complex solicitations. Basically, you put out your basic requirements. Whoever has the capability to meet all those basic requirements and has the lowest price wins. Period. The other is Best Value. You don't
have to award to lowest price, but you've got to be very explicit on what is the minimum acceptable and how much exceeding that is worth. This can be used to justify not awarding to the lowest bidder, but you must do the analysis exactly as you say you will. The KC-X was one of these.
Keep in mind that KC-X was a replacement for the KC-135. They [said] they weren't looking for a KC-10 replacement or a much higher capacity vehicle. That would come later in KC-Y or KC-Z. They wanted it quickly ("quickly" being a relative term in the Government), established minimum capabilities required and desirable features. They indicated how much extra credit would be given for certain features that could be used to offset a higher price in the competition, and said there may be other things considered only as a tie breaker but otherwise would receive no extra credit.
When the two bids came in, they noted how much extra cargo the KC-30, especially under the floor and decided they wanted that cargo capacity. Problem is, they never asked for all that in the solicitation. The proper thing to do would be to revise and reissue the RFP and analyze the subsequent bids under the new criteria, but they didn't do that. Instead they just decided to not follow their own rules and do the analysis in such a way that they could get the new stuff they now wanted. Some examples:
One of the requirements was that KC-X had to perform a standard, defined "escape maneuver" (used when the tanker was threatened by opposing forces). The KC-135 could do this maneuver and apparently so could the KC-767. The KC-30 could not, so they simply ignored that in the evaluation.
There was a go/no go requirement that KC-X had to be able to refuel any AAR-capable fixed wing aircraft in USAF inventory. KC-30 couldn't, but this was ignored.
At the time, USAF wanted a guarantee that once in service major maintenance would transition to the Air Force and the contractor would facilitate this transition. Airbus wouldn't provide such a guarantee, but AF dismissed this as a "clerical error".
There was a requirement that KC-X had to be able to routinely operate from any KC-135 base or other fields that the KC-135 could. Much was made by the Europeans that the KC30 did not need runways as long as did the KC-767, and they were 100% correct. What the problem was that because it was so much larger and heavier, it couldn't use existing KC-135-capable taxiways and intersections. If AF wanted to allow this, they would have to add the cost of modifying those at KC-135 bases, where necessary, to the KC-30 requirements to the overall price of the KC-30 bid. Since this would add hundreds of millions of $ to the KC-30 bid, they just didn't add the costs.
One significant analysis point was how many KC-Xs could operate from a specified ramp size using standard USAF wingtip-to-wingtip spacing. Being a larger aircraft, naturally fewer KC-30s could fit. So, without telling Boeing, they simply reduced the required spacing so more KC-30s would fit.
Although the solicitation said that beyond a certain value, no further credit would be given (I believe it was for even more below floor cargo). Yet in the analysis they gave the KC-30 extra credit beyond that point.
Again, one of Boeing's most powerful arguments was that if USAF had published specifications for them to bid to for what USAF actually selected on, rather than what they announced they were going to select on, their bid would have been substantially different. They bid the KC-767 because they could meet the AF's stated requirements at a lower cost with it than with a larger machine with larger capabilities. We might have even seen the KC-777. Not saying it would have won. Not saying the KC-30 wasn't a more capable tanker overall than the KC-767, albeit more expensive. We know it was more expensive, because if it had come in lower cost, Boeing would have had nothing to protest.
Just saying that the cancellation of the KC-30/45 award can't be explained away by saying it was simply politics.