Typhoon near miss SE of Elgin
The threat to aircrew and the general public continues due the lack of a Collision Warning System for Typhoon. Below is an extract from the latest Airprox report (No 2019238)
"An Airprox was reported when 2 Typhoon aircraft flew into proximity around 12nm SE of Elgin at 1345hrs on Monday 12th August 2019. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and both were in receipt of a reduced Traffic Service from Lossiemouth Approach.
Of note, CWS on Typhoon remains a high priority as a mitigation to the risk of MAC. Recent trials of Enhanced Collision Awareness System (ECAS) have been unsuccessful, delaying the installation onto the front-line aircraft. The trial produced recommendations for a comprehensive review of the system concept and highlighted areas that needed improvement if ECAS was to be integrated effectively onto the Typhoon. Once a workable solution is available, further trials will take place"
I know that Douglas Ross MP has raised several questions in parliament about the lack of CWS in the Typhoon aircraft and the inadequacy of ECAS. Typhoon needs a CWS similar to the one that was fitted to Tornado, not a quick fix 'bodge up' that fails to meet the recommendations set out in the MAA Def Stan to mitigate the Mid-Air Collision risk. We need collision AVOIDANCE (TCAS), as promised, not collision AWARENESS.
In 2014 Air Marshal Garwood, the then DG MAA, stated in his annual report "Given the MAC [Mid Air Collision] risk and the existence of a credible mitigation in the form of TCAS, until the point at which a firm commitment is made to fit such a system to each of our fast-jet platforms, their respective ALARP statuses will remain open to challenge" The MAC risk for Typhoon, Hawk T1 and Lightening II is not ALARP and as such routine operations should cease in order to be compliant with MAA regulations. Of course this was ignored in 2012 and resulted in a collision of two Tornado aircraft over the Moray Firth.
In 2008 Andrew Walker, coroner for the XV230 inquest, accused the MoD of adopting a cavalier approach to flight safety, nothing has changed. Furthermore, the Lord Advocate should be advised that these issues continue as a result of 'the ongoing 'systemic defect in a system of working'namely the ‘flawed’ interpretation by Duty Holders of the ALARP standard, which is a continued threat to aircrew and the general public (Public interest). This 'systemic defect' could have been identified at an FAI for the Tornado collision.
DV