ATCwatcher, whilst RTOW was calculated for the original conditions, it was not recalculated for the actual tailwind condition passed to the crew. The difference WAS hugely significant; not to have recalculated RTOW shows either poor SOPs or that the Commander was taking an unacceptable risk. Those are very worrying postulations; either AF training was at fault or the Commander's risk management was fundamentally unsound. What other reason could there be for failing to carry out such a very basic duty?
You state: "CVR shows FO announcing #2 down, and then later fire alarm is on., then FE announces shutting down 2, the capt later ask to confirm #2 was shut down, FE replies : it is ,all this between V1 and Vr.
Looks very professional to me."
No, it was anything but. In response to the FO calling out the loss of thrust on #2, the call should have been "FULL POWER". Only when the ac was at a safe height and speed should the Commander have made a positive call of "Shut down #2 engine" Even then, the engine would not have been shut down without independent confirmation that the correct engine was being shut down.
I have taught and examined hundreds, if not thousands of single and double engine failures in 4-jet aircraft and have experienced several in-flight engine failures myself, including at MTOW and V1 in Bahrain. The drills must be instinctive, correct and employ sound CRM. None of which seems to have applied in the AF Concorde accident.