737 Max - are the regulators wrong?
Is the increasing elevator feel with increased angle of attack a useless hangover from the first world war? If so the archaic regulators and their disciples responsible for the worse ever peace time aviation scandal.
My revised 1969 B.L.A.C instructor's manual has 4 stall symptoms; falling airspeed, decreasing effectiveness of controls, buffeting and aircraft sinks.
My 1999 B.G.A manual has eight including probable changed effectiveness of elevator.
But none mentioned increased stick force.
I now fly paragliders whose pitch control force increase towards the stall by design but it hasn't stopped me accidentally spinning a wing – twice.
In 1971 after passing my IRT I had ten hours to burn on the flying doctor widow maker; the Beech Baron. Over the new forest I did a clean, power off stall which ended up inverted having completed a half flick roll before I centralised the controls.
40 years later I similarly ended up inverted at 200ft flying a Grob glider near the Cape Gliding Club S.A. whilst demonstrating French mountain soaring techniques. Again without any noticeable change in stick force.
In 1972 my best mate mistakenly retracted the slats and despite the stick shaker and stick push going he died. One of the accident investigators stated that the simulator pitch control wasn't the same as the aircraft. We hadn't flown approach to the stall in real life as it was deemed too dangerous after a Trident was nearly lost.
A couple of years later a new boy, whilst sir was in the loo, selected slats out whilst in the Clacton hold around 25,000ft. The aircraft stalled (above mach limitation) and only recovered after careering through several other aircrafts flight paths into lower air.
A couple of times I heard brief stick shakes during approach in turbulence. Stick force not mentioned.
I was in the classroom when our DC10s were grounded after Chicago when the engine fell off taking out two of the hydraulic systems allowing the slats on that side to retract. No cockpit indication nor slat locking device and the wing stalled.
We were only allowed to fly it with CWS plugged in so control forces were irrelevant.
I was one of the first lot of pilots on the Fokker 100 with full time thrust stall protection according to our books. Two crews both doing a split arse visual approaches into Nice at low level had the stall warning go. No one noticed the stick pressure and why would they in a descending turn. The manuals were re written.
A mate in a big Boeing levelled off in descent...stick shaker reminded him to engage autothrottle.
AF447...glider pilot operating a one man band as captain chasing crumpet and senior first officer a wet paper bag (management doing a 90 day currency trip). How relevant increased stick force?
Nor with the Airbus test pilot sinking one in the Golf de Lyon.
Another mate who was squadron test pilot on the Gnat got a loop wrong due to alcoholic haze..high G, high speed buffet saved him but burnt some pasture.
I can go on and my Mrs often says I do but in all of my flying increased stick force has never alerted me to an approaching stall.
Maybe it became fashionable and sticking two cheap springs on the stick whose force increased the more they were stretched set the normal but imho it is a complete waste of time on a large transport aircraft.
So why fix a problem which doesn't exist? And with a bodge at that!