The change in the summary format, as with the Airbus publication, represents the decreasing usefulness of previous approaches.
Many safety management systems focus on fatalities, but in an industry with few fatal accidents this view has little or no value in judging action to reduce future accidents.
Historical risk (outcome - fatalities - probability) can be quantified, although potentially biased by allocation of cause or contributing factors.
Future risk is a judgement - expert guess of what might happen, based on scant historical risk. This approach is open to flawed thinking - that the future will be the same as the past - same number of fatalities, passenger load vs freighter for same type, or not considering intervening aircraft modification or crew training.
An example is with LoC, often cited as the dominant safety issue. This might be true according to a 20 year history, but comparing different generations of aircraft, then the latter are significantly safer (Airbus review).
An alternative approach to safety could minimise cost and effort on training for every type of aircraft by focusing more on older aircraft. Also, a closer study might identify significant differences so that more targeted training can be given; e.g. instead of requiring ill-specified manual flight for everyone, focus on flight without auto-throttle or without FD to encourage instrument scanning, speed awareness, for some types, could help avoid a particular aspect of the LoC threat, which may be well-protected in modern types.
https://www.airbus.com/content/dam/c...-1958-2019.pdf