While the NTSB will be out for a long time determining the probable cause of this unfortunate crash, factors, IMHO, do point to continued VFR into IMC.
I say this with respect to the victim's families, including the pilot's family.
More information will be forthcoming of course. But a number of rotorcraft instructors in this forum have been very informative about VFR into IMC in a training scenario, which is something, as a fixed wing pilot, I was unaware of. Especially given the experience of the pilot. Inadvertent VFR into IMC is not good. But even more challenging for the rotorcraft pilot.
For anyone who's ever wondered about continued VFR into IMC accidents under Part 135, read the Capstone Project. A 17 year study of every air taxi accident in Alaska. The FAA chose Alaskan Part 135 operations for good reason. There was a lot of data. Alaskan Part 135 operations altered the national average.
https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/programs...dy_15APR04.pdf
Some excerpts:
"controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) crashes, as they have termed those events, account for 50 percent of the total commercial accidents and are responsible for 79 percent of the commercial fatalities."
"the majority of VFR into IMC crashes occurred within 25 miles of the departure airport during the first leg of flight, during daylight hours on flat, snow-covered terrain. The majority of the pilots in these events had weather reporting capabilities and instrument approach facilities available. More startling is that the majority of these pilots were aware of the weather conditions at the time of departure. The report shows that a large number of these pilots were operating aircraft that were equipped for instrument flight but not certified."
"only 5 percent of the pilots involved in crashes for the active certificates were not certificated to operate in instrument meteorological conditions"