Turb 70, automate it,
As per megan, automation is not a complete answer; even if there is an 'answer' at all.
Increasing caution is required with single focus solutions, or extreme alternatives - black or white, man or machine.
Resolving situations like the Max has to consider the middle ground; the messy grey areas of uncertainty which humans dislike and tend to avoid. Depending on viewpoint, the Max issue was a breakdown of man and machine; good people, but asked to do more than their capability (design / pilots), good technology, in theory, but poorly implemented and certified. Consider the grey areas, man and machine together as one, the processes of design and certification, but don't expect a quick or easy way forward.
So far the FAA has kept their heads down and have escaped most of the criticism, but their responsibility and oversight of the certification was equally flawed as Boeing's contribution.
In the pursuit of increased safety, both parties have a role, but which one might might lead. FAA (with other world regulators) indicate acceptable means of man and machine implementation - how much credit to be given to the human. But regulations do not design aircraft.
Boeing could propose advanced man and machine concepts; learning from research, but requiring proof of concept for regulation, which involves 'educating' the FAA. Can, or what might the FAA learn.
With a well balanced man and machine concept, the human must be seen as an advantage, not as a hazard,
The approach integrating man and machine might not be that difficult to achieve, but the necessary functions within FAA and Boeing might be more difficult as both depend on world views of the their much dented capabilities. As much as the industry needs man and machine, they need FAA and Boeing.