SASless
Since I posted that reply, I've been shown the Crowsnest timescales, as of March 2019. I'd say they were only attainable if, in March 2019, they were already 90% of the way through trials, and everything was going really well. Given the reported problems, that is unlikely, so there would seem to have been a degree of optimism.
The main technical issue mentioned, which MAY be some sort of receiver sensitivity mismatch, is a well-known gotcha, and was both predicted and occurred on Sea King ASaC Mk7. (But not by the prime contractor, which is what caused difficulty). That being so, and assuming Crowsnest is meant to upgrade aspects of the Mk7 system, then that would (or should) be one of the top technical risks, as it was on Mk7.
That doesn't mean it could have been fully mitigated, because quite often 'requirements' handed to procurers defy the laws of physics. Any solution would require extensive trialling, as (and I stand to be corrected on these matters) the resultant installed performance in turn dictates tactics and training - the latter is mentioned in the linked article - and not just of this aircraft.
It makes me wonder if Crowsnest read the Post Project Evaluations from ASaC Mk7 - which set all this out in great detail as it was known FOAEW/MASC was coming along. It is well known FOAEW and then MASC didn't, as their cunning plan was to lift the mission system out of ASaC and simply drop it in a Merlin. For a start, the consoles were part of the aircraft structure, which automatically makes the airframe part of the programme very significant.
All a long time ago I'm afraid, and MoD is unlikely to have anyone left who remembers this. Certainly none of the ASaC team is left. Wheels get reinvented, and turn out square.