The reference to flight controls is open to interpretation - revised link to Flight Global
https://www.flightglobal.com/air-tra...136296.article
"…
the NMA’s design must center around the flight control system and how pilots interact with that system – a topic highlighted by the 737 Max crashes.
“We might have to start with the flight control philosophy before we actually get to the airplane,”…. Design decisions related to “pilots flying airplanes” are “very important… for the regulator and for us to get our head around”.
Previously Boeing retained what some views defined as 'old style' pilot interface, applying this to their high tech aircraft (if only to differ from Airbus).
Thus the new suggestions for change might reconsider this philosophy; primarily addressing the issues of how pilots interact with aircraft, fly and operate modern technology, which will presumable start with the level of automation and systems integrity - considering the role and contribution of the human in flight operations.
The background to Boeing's existing (FBW) approach, a pilot's view, (published circa 1990 ?) is here:-
https://www.dropbox.com/s/x5jaqackx4...2B%2B.pdf?dl=0
Assuming that this was aimed at the 787 onwards, it was not retrospectively applied to the 737, nor subsequent derivatives - a regrettable decision with hindsight.
Thus what now might change. Is Boeing heeding previous advice; last words in the document:-
'…
a dynamic philosophy that will be revised as we learn more about the complex human factors factors which control the way pilots fly airplanes'.
What has Boeing learnt about HF from recent events (777, NG, Max), how does this now relate to the new technologies which might not have been available at the time of Ken Higgins report; interesting times.
Not so much as the 'way pilots fly aircraft', but more about how pilots should / could operate aircraft.