Originally Posted by
Clandestino
You got it in one, OldnGrounded, now let me help our friends with somewhat Manichean worldview that separates pilots into sharply defined categories of "good" and "bad" by reminding them that the
official report of A6-FDN catastrophe is full of references to successful first windshear escape and go-around, before the second, fatal one. So if we go by the philosophy that there are good and bad pilots (and its quite sinister implication, pervading the MAX threads that the bad pilots destroyed the good aeroplanes) , we would be at loss to explain how the good pilots turned into the bad in the matter of hours.
Clandestino
I would say that 'bad' and 'good' are being used to create unrestricted generalizations. Even though it is the case that there are indeed such 'types' and that certain people are indeed trying to smear the pilots in the MAX accidents to protect Boeing you make your point poorly. The example chosen is a case of a pilot getting it horribly wrong and the first successful go around is irrelevant to the outcome apart from being one of the links in the causal chain which led to a lot of unnecessary deaths. I am all in favour of greater automation as it is likely that it would eliminate accidents like this one but to my mind the issue is more to do with corporate irresponsibility and the moral bankruptcy reigning at Boeing. A pilot should have all the information he needs about his aircraft to be able to fly it successfully. Unfortunately it is an aspect of American corporate life that uncomfortable facts, flaws in the product and developments are hidden if they impact the bottom line. The Boeing behaviour in the Turkish accident is regrettably not unusual and will continue, if not at Boeing, at other companies. It is always thus where money is placed on a pedestal.
The answer is that the regulatory authorities resist this kind of pressure and remain pure. However, this is perhaps a pipe dream.
OC