Avoiding VFR into IMC accidents

[Frontal Lobotomy]

Jonkster I think it is the centre page of ASD #82 from November 1972 to which you are referring:

"What More Can We Say

WITH one exception, every Aviation Safety Digest produced in the past two years, this one included, has dealt at length with the unhappy results of attempted visual operations in "Below VMC" weather. The one exception is more than offset by the fact that last year's March issue was given wholly to a detailed study of accidents in this category. In addition, nearly all these issues have included editorial and technical comment on the attitudes of mind and the operational circumstances that combine to produce accidents of this type. In this two year period, 17 accidents of this type have been studied in the Digest. All but three of these were fatal and, in total, they cost a staggering 52 lives.

Eight years ago, a similar "Below VMC" accident trend, though on a much smaller scale, developed during the winter months of 1964. Some very forceful Departmental publicity followed, including a personal letter to all general aviation pilots from the Director-General, as well as a detailed analysis of each of the accidents in the Aviation Safety Digest. It was subsequently most encouraging to find that, despite the steady growth in general aviation activity that followed this time, there was only one further fatal accident of this type in Australia for almost five years. Unfortunately as it turned out, this proved to be only the calm before the storm, for in the latter part of 1969 and throughout 1970, there was a veritable spate of accidents, most of them fatal, in the same category. It was these that prompted the very emphatic treatment of the subject in our March issue last year.

To judge from our 1964 experience and what followed, it seemed reasonable to suppose that this further publicity in the Digest might prove similarly efficacious in averting future potential accidents of this type. Regrettably, the issues that have followed tell quite a different story and any such pious hopes have been well and truly shattered.Now, having examined all these further accidents at length, and having considered and discussed in depth the reactions and motives that combined to bring them about, we must confess to having almost scraped the bottom of the safety education barrel on the subject. So what more can we say about this seemingly elementary problem which yet continues to be responsible for such a high proportion of our general aviation fatalities?

Much of the trouble associated with unforeseen disasters of this type seems to be that their symptoms are so very subtle; Flying is such an enjoyable and effortless way of getting from A to B; To a qualified pilot, even if not greatly experienced, a modern, comfortable and speedy light aeroplane is so easy and satisfying to handle; On the other hand, it can be so very frustrating when unexpected cloud or poor visibility dictates that this desirable means of transport should be turned back and landed at some "alternate" aerodrome to wait hours, or even overnight, for some improvement in the weather.Indeed, it is the very performance of our machine itself, that makes it all the more frustrating, for we know that we could be through that "little area of dirty weather" in only a few minutes. And our aircraft seems so safe, solid and reliable - surely it is worth "giving it a go". After all, we can still turn back if we find the going too tough, so where's the problem?

The whole trouble with this reasoning is that, by the time the pilot has learnt to his horror that there is indeed a problem, it is already too late - more often than not the aeroplane is completely out of control in a screaming spiral dive! It's not good enough to say "it won't happen to me!" Pilots who are not instrument trained but who insist on pressing their luck in marginal weather, even "cautiously'', will sooner or later find this out for themselves. And what of those pilots who have the ability to fly on instruments,but who yet, in their own wisdom, choose to compromise the very terrain clearance standards that hard-won experience has consistently shown to be vital to safe flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions? when their moment of truth comes, they probably won't have enough time to reason why!

Sceptical readers need not take our word for these claims - intelligent study of all material referred to will establish the facts clearly enough. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of it all is that some of the victims caught in these situations are not the swashbuckling, press-on-regardless, accident-going-somewhere-to-happen types we might expect. They are quite often ordinary, normally careful and responsible private pilots, who simply don't recognise their limitations.

All that needs to be said about the mechanics of these accidents has been repeated ad nauseam in the Digest over the past two years. We make no apology for having continued to cover this subject - the need for repetition is not of our making and, in fact, we would like to be able to devote space to other air safety problems. We therefore earnestly suggest that you re-read what has been said on the subject in the Digest over the past two years - it could literally mean the difference between life and death - YOURS! ...,."