Hindsight itself is not painful; it is the subsequent realisation that lessons were not learnt, advice not heeded, nor actions taken.
The NYT article is timely, and ‘unusually’ accurate and to the point, in comparison with some media reviews.
Full accident report:
http://reports.aviation-safety.net/2...738_TC-JGE.pdf
Appendix B: Comments of parties involved - NTSB / Boeing, (Page 140) provides insight to the review process and particularly the theme of blame the pilots, checklists, procedures; ‘
we have flow this in the M Cab and our pilots were able to recover the aircraft’. ~ Walter Mitty.
The response to remark #1 - was a timely ‘put down’ of the NTSB / Boeing’s opening distraction that reporting format reduces safety impact and lessons learnt, even more so for the Max. ~ Delusion.
Appendix M: Simulator Tests (after this accident), (Page 201)
‘
Evaluation of the aerodynamic performance data showed that once the aircraft stalled (approximately 5 seconds after the onset of stick shaker) there was insufficient altitude for the airplane to be successfully recovered. Therefore, the post stall recovery flight regime was not investigated during the M-Cab simulation tests.’
The NYT article, and the accident report, should reinforce the wake up call emerging from the Max saga. Not specifically directed Boeing, FAA, NTSB, but for world manufacturing, regulation, investigation and operations.
Woods and Dekker,
http://www.humanfactors.lth.se/filea...Dekker2001.pdf
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/...pdf?sequence=1
and for info:
https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/773...01_09_2015.pdf
“case studies to show the interweaving of organizational and individual journeys, each of which began with
the strength to inquire and to challenge assumptions.”
Is it possible to get a copy, or at least view the ‘Dekker report’. Noting its intended confidentiality, perhaps via PM.
Alternatively as a bold safety statement, publishing the report anonymously with the objective of learning and changing even at this late stage.