retired guy, thanks
Your analogy of control being behind the glass is very apt for automation - our fear of ‘being out of control’ of a technical entity.
However, because the issues arising from the 737 Max accidents are overwhelmingly human, we need to have a key behind the glass for unlocking human thought - thinking for appropriate behaviours. Unfortunately thinking does not involve just one ‘key’; in fact so many it is impossible to describe all aspects, nor provide a conclusive solution.
In this instance we have to consider the issue differently, to seek consensus opposed to a solution, a range of possible interventions - small changes so as not to upset the delicate balance of safety due to unforeseen effects, and to manage the resultant uncertainty - when is an aircraft, pilot, organisation, situation, safe enough.
The regulatory side of the divide shows promise with the introduction of the world-wide group. The current situation requires a consensus to allow the Max to return to service. Future regulation could be based on a group of like minded people - their regulations (FAR/CS 25) reaching agreement for certification, similar to current processes but not necessarily requiring a leader for best practice - FAA would be a participant in a world process.
The Boeing side is more difficult to judge. Fix Max and put it behind them, then consider what next. Boeing’s philosophy for human-machine differs from Airbus, but neither should be judged better or not. The important aspect is how each philosophy is applied; Boeing piecemeal across several types, some retrospectively; Airbus, prospectively, consistently across all types. What should Boeing do?
Being aware of the hazards of large changes, a clean-sheet aircraft will take time. Developing existing aircraft also requires a marketplace, which depends on trust, confidence, etc.
Boeing’s difficulty is not necessarily good for the industry; excellence thrives on competition. Airbus recognises this - risk of letting standards slip, complacency, not having to think too much about the immediate future.
Recent news suggest that Boeing will take a short term view of discounting the market for Max. This might challenge world competitive agreements, but that could be easier to manage than a new product line with the FAA. Time to heal the FAA, customer, supplier, relationships, which could be further eased with a world view of regulation; not Boeing vs the FAA, but Boeing with the regulatory authorities and other manufacturers.