Originally Posted by
27/09
.... Rog you left a very important piece out of your post
.......and the pilot training if left as it was.
Did it not occur to you that is was strange that the Ethiopian crew seemed oblivious to the quirks of the MCAS system despite all of the information that came out after the Lion Air crash? Any pilots I know of would have been all over this info, why weren't the Ethiopian crew?
As you know all of the issues you raise will be addressed with the fixes for the Max.
Hi there - Yes thank you, I did leave out here in my posts re the facts of intensive pilot training.
We could go on to say that Boeing had no intentions to address pilot training if MCAS was never seen as a culprit in any crashes - Blame it on the pilots?
PLUS we must be minded of the re-training, rewriting of the FCOM, aircraft and Ops manuals etc etc,
when and if the MAX returns to service, which will take months....
I did include all those references in my post in R&N but purposely left them out here to keep it simple.
I also left out the fact of Pilot Type rating commonalty with the 737 Classic and NG - Which is another factor in granting the MAX type approval using Grandfather rights of 1967.
I'm sorry but here I am not in the pilot blaming game - I think all the crews were faced with a rather dreadful scenario(s) which overwhelmed them within minutes leading quickly to the deaths of 346.
My pal down here is a 737 SIM instructor (and a 727/737/747 Capt with 15000+ hours) - He has reenacted the MAX scenarios in the SIM - Let's just leave it there shall we....
Back on thread topic - As mentioned I for one (being an (I hope!) informed aviation professional since 1972) would not board a MAX until such a time I felt like it could warrant it.