PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures Mk II
Old 21st Dec 2019, 03:59
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MechEngr
 
Join Date: Oct 2019
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Originally Posted by jimtx
Why don't we just turn MCAS off and when the autopilot is off and the airplane is in the envelope put a force sensor that says "don't pull too hard"? Rhetorical question of course as I can't envision anybody buying that the airframe is safe as is under human pilot control although it seems the autopilot would not be affected. But the above posts regarding freedom of information make me wonder what really is going on with the airframe as even the first AD did not caution about any regime once you successfully applied the runaway trim procedure. I can not make sense of the last BOE 1 flight aware track so I wonder WTF is going on.
Because one day a maint crew or a hungry rodent will screw something up that has nothing to do with MCAS and Boeing will be blamed for allowing the crash that happens because pilots forget how to trim the plane in their concern for the memory items they did not memorize Having the plane tell them what to do is the only avenue left.

To be fair, the ET302 crew failed to perform the AD or follow the FCOM information or read the Lion Air preliminary crash report. None of that seems to have been learned, if they even bothered reading it. I guess the AD should have said - pedal to the metal and ignore being out of trim is bad. Is that something pilots need to have written for them? The only way out is a plane that tells them to do their job.
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