Originally Posted by
edmundronald
I agree with you partially. You are right, that the fault wasn't caught on review was an issue of abusive self-certification. But certification relates to CHECKING the design. No reasonable engineer would have DESIGNED a single-sensor AoA input into MCAS. This design is the result of engineering incompetence, or carelessness, not pressure. Any engineer asked to do that design with an aero sensor in the loop would normally have started with a multi-input spec because sensors are notorious for going on the blink.
The elevator where I live tried to go through the roof because a position sensor failed; it was caught and stopped by a failsafe switch. Sensors are notorious issues in engineering, in the same way I guess as crosswind on landing is notorious for flying. They fail, the design catches it.
With respect, I believe there is a safety culture for pilots,which is taught via pilot training and then on-the-job in addition to flying skills. In the same way engineering companies have a culture for getting their product out the door, and this culture is pervasive inside the company. At Boeing the engineering culture has gone bad, and an MCAS fix won't cure that.
Edmund
Guess I'll disagree re your view of engineers. The original version of MCAS used mach and G limits and minimal change in horiz stab at a rare portion of envelope. granted the use of a single AOA was not appropriate. But after telling FAA what the system was- it was later changed to eliminate g and mach inputs and rely only on AOA and at a total movement 4 times that of origional. Those who disagreed apparently had career and family issues in mind.
And for over 2 decades, the bean counters ruled.
So while one might question maybe two or three " engineers" it is inappropriate to tar all.