Originally Posted by
edmundronald
I agree with you partially. You are right, that the fault wasn't caught on review was an issue of abusive self-certification. But certification relates to CHECKING the design. No reasonable engineer would have DESIGNED a single-sensor AoA input into MCAS. This design is the result of engineering incompetence, or carelessness, not pressure. Any engineer asked to do that design with an aero sensor in the loop would normally have started with a multi-input spec because sensors are notorious for going on the blink.
The elevator where I live tried to go through the roof because a position sensor failed; it was caught and stopped by a failsafe switch. Sensors are notorious issues in engineering, in the same way I guess as crosswind on landing is notorious for flying. They fail, the design catches it.
With respect, I believe there is a safety culture for pilots,which is taught via pilot training and then on-the-job in addition to flying skills. In the same way engineering companies have a culture for getting their product out the door, and this culture is pervasive inside the company. At Boeing the engineering culture has gone bad, and an MCAS fix won't cure that.
Edmund
Sadly the evidence supports this negative assessment of Boeing's engineering culture.
The company has had a succession of egregious cost and schedule issues, in civil most notably with the 787, but also in defense, with the 767 tanker versions the poster child, hugely late for Japan, for Italy and now the USAF.
The firms current NASA work follows the same pattern. Nowhere is there a recognition that something stinks, so the rot keeps spreading. .