Originally Posted by
CurtainTwitcher
In a word: profit.
Doing any sort of AoA comparison, would require a warning to the crew, and any new warning would have reduced the probability of a common type endorsement
without simulator time for the training. This was a key design criteria for the MAX,
no crew training beyond a short iPad course. Southwest included a $1 million per airframe penalty in the contract for the MAX if simulator training was required.
I don't know how much of the MAX threads you have read, the key name you want to search for is Rick Ludtke on this issue (
pprune.org search). He documents internal Boeing design mandate. There hasn't been a denial from Boeing as far as I am aware.
Yes, it is really that simple, to maximise sales and profit, every change had to be viewed through the prism of continued commonality.
Didn't the NG ship with a (non-optional) AoA comparison and disagree warning? And wasn't the omission of this warning in the Max discovered by Boeing late in development (or after certification)? And didn't they tell the FAA they were going to add it back in with the next update to the display software?
If so, then this has nothing to do with common type endorsements or Rick Ludtke, right?