Originally Posted by
jimtx
So what should the pilots be afraid of once the electric trim is dissabled and MCAS is no longer there to protect them. Shouldn’t that be in your procedure? Hint: I’m one of the guys that think MCAS is not needed. But I don’t think anyone could walk back what has happened to saying we are just going to turn it off. I wouldn’t mind trying though unless there is a greater surprise.
My gut feeling (which isn't worth much and needs some data from Boeing to actually decide) is that the whole reason for this situation is that the contribution of MCAS in normal operations is slight and that it was entirely there for the control linearity requirement.Based on my gut, there isn't much to protect from as it does not do stall recovery only feel, and this is the main reason that no one thought of what MCAS would do if the AoA system was lying. If it was intended to do very little how could anyone imagine it would do very much?
I expect that the new version of software will have a big chunk of changes to validate AoA inputs and that this particular situation will happen as often as "trim runaway" does on the NG, which seems to be - has never happened.