PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 13th Dec 2019, 02:53
  #4446 (permalink)  
jimtx
 
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Originally Posted by MechEngr
Seems like the cure is to simplify the checklist:
Are the following happening:
1) autopilot kicked out unexpectedly
2) pitch trim moving unexpectedly
3) pitch control force increasing unexpectedly

Return pitch control force to zero with control wheel switches and then immediately disable trim motors.
Set the pilot not flying the job of operating the trim wheel as directed by the PF.
If that does not work, pilot not flying will re-enable the switches as directed by the PF only long enough to use the trim switches to zero pitch control forces and immediately disable them when completed.

As the pilot is able, immediately declare emergency and land ASAP.

These are indicators the pilots can memorize.
So what should the pilots be afraid of once the electric trim is dissabled and MCAS is no longer there to protect them. Shouldn’t that be in your procedure? Hint: I’m one of the guys that think MCAS is not needed. But I don’t think anyone could walk back what has happened to saying we are just going to turn it off. I wouldn’t mind trying though unless there is a greater surprise.
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