e tanto per smentire qualcuno il F/O aveva pių esperienza del Cpt anche se non sul 737 , e questo mi fa un po’ pensare
Vero. Ci ha provato, ma non ci č riuscito. E comunque 12 secondi sono veramente pochi ...
The events of the psychological incapacitation, when the PF verbally responds to the communication and physically exercises the control inputs, but these are obviously inconsistent with the current flight environment, as a rule, are not incorporated into the airlines OM. The Flydubai airline OM did not state such occurrences either. Consequently, the PM for more than 30 s had been prompting the correct actions to PF and at a certain point even tried to intervene in the control with prompting the correct direction of the control column deflection “by the action”. Still, because of the continued inappropriate actions by the PIC and the specific features of the pitch control system (Sections 1.16.7 and 1.16.8), the actions by the F/O had been unsuccessful.
A major factor that led to the PIC’s spatial disorientation and his inability to take appropriate actions was, probably, the G-force that, as the result of his control inputs, reached the near-zero and negative values. The practice of flights with the near-zero and negative G is the evidence that the pilots, who encounter zero G for the first time (even if fastened by the seat belts) during the first seconds are not just incapacitated, but spatially disoriented as well. In addition at the near-zero and negative Gs together with the unsecured objects the mud and dust, always present in the cockpit, float up in the air. This occurs, generally, all of a sudden, with a startle effect to the crew
5.10. Consider the practicability of the elaboration of the flight personnel training programs, allowing for the incorporation of the practical familiarization (training) of the pilots with the upset conditions, including zero and negative G state.