PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 7th Dec 2019, 23:55
  #4325 (permalink)  
Loose rivets
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the one comment I like from above posts is a MCAS warning light, similar to the STAB OUT OF TRIM light, crude but simple.
And pressing it to stop that piece of software running would be a nice addition.

Craig Bomben,
“We’ve moved from a very simple system to an intelligent system.”
Okay, but Airbus took years to develop their HAL. This seems a limited time to develop a sapient being.

But if it is correctly triggered, the system now “operates only once per AoA event”, according to Bomben, and when it does trigger stabiliser movement, it memorises how much displacement has taken place, so if it were triggered again it would take account of existing stabiliser displacement and will not apply more than a safe cumulative limit.
Now define a single AoA event.
FAA regulations require that one of the cues to the pilot of the approaching stall is that the stick force should increase at a linear rate as the airspeed decreases and the angle of attack increases. FAA regulations require that one of the cues to the pilot of the approaching stall is that the stick force should increase at a linear rate as the airspeed decreases and the angle of attack increases. In the Max, however, at a certain point in this sequence the centre of lift shifts forward a little, providing a slight nose-up pitch force, therefore the stick force does not continue to increase, so MCAS is designed to kick in with some nose-down trim to restore the linear increase.
By comparison, does the NT stick force (needed) actually increase, or just not get lighter so quickly? There has been strong inference that the MAX gets unacceptably and specifically lighter.
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