Originally Posted by
Bend alot
Any evidence for that bird strike ET had?
Bad part was certainly a contributing factor and Neanderthal type work is not limited to African countries.
While the engineering concept of the MAX is very poor, the intentional secrecy of MCAS and the changes that had to be made for the system to work was a larger part of "everything".
If the system was known, key information given (pulling back on the stick no longer his the cut out switches guys), correct training given - we probably would not be talking about the MAX now. But it was too important for the MAX to be just an NG.
Are Boeing still doing lots of flight testing in the MAX?
What "intentional secrecy" are you referencing. I think the use of MCAS was not hidden from anyone. Boeing (Chief Technical Pilot Forkner) appears to have put it in the Brazilian certifying authority's list of differences and maybe it showed up in some other states differences. Did it not show up in the FAA list of differences because of secrecy or because Boeing and the FAA thought the pencil whip in a rarely visited flight regime was not worth mentioning? But the later expansion of the MCAS envelope does raise questions about who knew what and who was told about that. But my question is whether the training, category B and referenced in their differences certification, that should/would have been given to the Brazilian pilots flying the MAX would have been sufficient for them to deal with the two accident conditions. What training was that?
Off this topic observation: Unless there is a real surprise in the MAX's handling I agree with the Canadian authority. MCAS should turned off. And I was saying this before the Canadians did.