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Old 5th Dec 2019, 03:28
  #95 (permalink)  
Starbear
 
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Originally Posted by safetypee
Starbear, “- the pilot does in fact have another tool with which to contain the pitch up and that is the reduction of thrust in conjunction with pitch inputs.”

You appear to overlook that the GA was in response to a Windshear alert, which in general (overwhelmingly) requires maximum thrust.
At some point there may be a conflict between reducing thrust as judged by the crew in the actual conditions, and the operators SOP, - cognitive dissonance - mental effort, confusion, distraction.

What do operators teach and mandate by SOP ?
What advice do operators provide for reducing thrust after a Windshear GA ?
No, I don't believe that I did but perhaps did not make myself clear enough. Perhaps I should have included the full quote from his post but I was specifically referencing Centaurus' tale of teaching recovery from a severely out of trim/low speed situation such as the Turkish B737 at Amsterdam and offered the Thomsonfly B737 incident as a parallel to the Turkish one.I was not or not intending to link to the Flydubai incident. There have been quite a few others but am a little hazy on precise details now, without research but a couple of A310s, I think Tarom (?) but again severely out of trim for a variety of reasons. And the modifcations to a stall/approach to stall recovery were changed long before the FlyDubai case.

With regard to reactive windshear recovery and your posed questions, I would suggest that sadly the answer is "not very much" and is often as much use as the manufacturer's instruction to "smoothly adjust the pitch to follow the guidance". However what I can confirm from observation that many pilots continue to maintian an inapproriate high pitch attitude even when well clear of the windshear and/or terrain. Often as high as 20 deg (and more)for a sustained period with 2 or even 3,000 feet terrain clearance and reducing IAS.
They do not appear to have a reference for confiming they are now in a safe situation and able to revert to a normal GA type scenario. They always get there in the end, (so who can knock that?) but it is often very "untidy".

I would not comment on the pilots' reactions in the Dubai case, as I believe the report has already covered that very well.
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