Originally Posted by
Uplinker
Not being an expert, it seems to me that factors contributing to this accident were attempting a go-around using the unfamiliar, different, monochromatic symbology and presentation of an HUD, instead of the normal ADI, IAS, V/S and N1 gauges - leading to disorientation? Operation with one pilot on a HUD and the other on conventional instruments had not been sufficiently trained, nor allowed to be sufficiently practised - particularly in the case of an F/O taking control from a Captain - both using different instruments - during a high workload situation, such as a go-around, which is going pear shaped.
Add to this, a possibly fatigued crew during their WOCL, and a horrible weather situation. The Captain clearly felt pressure that he had to land at the destination, and also not go out of hours, whereas from one’s armchair it would seem reasonable to divert after the first two landing attempts.
I think I have experienced good company FRMS systems, but allowing airlines to monitor their own fatigue reporting and deal with it in-house could potentially be a case of the foxes looking after the hen house?
If fatigue reports had to be sent to and dealt with by the equivalent CAA, then fatigue would be officially examined and might actually have to change?
Fatigue reports are the same as confidential reports - managed within the SMS. If names get leaked then the Pilots lose trust in the SMS and stop reporting. Again some AOC's have sleep scientists that assess the rosters individually. However an aweful lot of Airlines also have (commercial) bio-mathematical modelling systems latched onto their scheduling systems which they use to convince their CAA's they are managing fatigue e.g. system says green so good to go. Are they validated, do they have data on that particular AOC - you know the answer.