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gums, et al.
The emerging views requiring more experience (and training) could relate to the pitch trim operation and ability to detect a trim runaway other than MCAS inhibit; which could also apply to the 737 NG.
The investigation into the Flydubai 737 accident, this forum, elicited the following information from Boeing: - the disclosure of opinion and assumption about pilots experience.
This relates to relatively inexperienced crews - perhaps more prevalent in modern times, the balance of flying P1 / P2 before obtain a command, and significantly that a new 737 Captain could have most prior experience on FBW aircraft - Boeing or Airbus.
Thus current crew experience of manual trim operation could be compared with that pre 707.
Upon the request of the investigation team the aircraft manufacturer, the Boeing Company, responded that the Boeing 737 aircraft documentation does not contain the specific guidance on the general principles of the forces trim. Boeing is of the opinion that the indicated skills are integral of the basic airmanship to perform flights on large transport aircraft. At the same time the manufacturer notes that this documentation is designed based on the assumption that the customers have had the previous flying experience on the jet multi-engine aircraft and are familiar with the basic systems of the jet aircraft and basic flight maneuvers, common for the aircraft of the type. In relation to this FCTM does not incorporate the background information, of which the awareness is considered as prerequisite to familiarize with the concerned document.
Note: … at the movable stabilizer introduction into service Boeing has issued the detailed guidance, explaining the general principles of the use of such systems through the Boeing 707 and 720 aircraft. These materials can be found in the Boeing Airliner magazines of April, 1959 and May, 1961 …