My 2 cents worth having read the report. Yes, its long and detailed but certainly worth reading for any pilot.
Massively disappointed by the lack of info on Fatigue and the Rosters of both pilots in the proceeding weeks. I know that the FO's roster was brutal leading up to the crash.
The number of fatigue reports submitted is eye opening and tells you all you need to know about the safety culture. I left FZ before the crash but if my blurry memory serves me correct, if you were brave enough to call in fatigued there was the threat of been sent to the AME for a "consultation" with the possibility of your medical being suspended while your fatigue was investigated.
The first discontinued approach was a windshear escape, the second was a standard go around procedure. With the first approach still fresh in the mind its so easy for any pilot who is absolutely shattered, dealing with awful weather conditions and staring through a bright HUD to get things wrong. 101% N1 was excessive but there is no N1 indication on the HUD as far as i can remember. You get so fixated on the HUD that your scan can breakdown especially when things start to become "non-normal".
The commercial pressure from ops's to "get in" is also a massive issue that doesn't really get interrogated. For sure they would have left DXB with somewhere close to full tanks of fuel knowing that the weather was marginal. Op's would always say "load it up with fuel and get in when you can", knowing that a divert will leave the operation an aircraft short for the next 12/15 hours. Normally as pilots we like to carry as much fuel as we can, but in this instance a bit of time pressure resulting from less fuel could have meant a divert earlier, maybe even after the first approach resulting in a totally different outcome.
Pretty much every pilot I ever flew with at FZ always feared that something like this might happen one day due to the fatiguing rosters and the nature of the destinations. Tragically in March 2016 all the holes in the cheese lined up.