Originally Posted by
Peter H
I'm still having a lot of trouble getting my head around B's thought processes.
1. Don't tell the pilots about the existence of MCAS
2. Expect the pilot to respond within seconds to an unintentional MCAS activation.
3. Expect the pilot to sit quietly through an intentional MCAS trim-down and the subsequent trim-up "reset" without touching the electric trim.
Worse than that, for (2) a response is expected in 3 (or 4, can't remember?) seconds whereas for MCAS to do it's job in (3) the pilot has to not notice the trim running for 9 seconds.
Possibly the assumption was that in an intentional MCAS trim-down the pilots would be otherwise occupied with impending stall, warnings, feel-shift etc. - this was proved correct...
Intentional but erroneous MCAS activation was never considered (if I understand JTAR correctly).