PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 12th Nov 2019, 09:54
  #3930 (permalink)  
Outofthefray
 
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Originally Posted by Maninthebar
It seems to me, and in answer to Gums point, that training MUST be offered to enable pilots to be able to distinguish 'correct' MCAS activation (allow auto trim to run to give stick forces per design) from 'incorrect' activation (diagnose after 3 seconds auto trim, retrim and then disconnect). That's going to be an interesting training package.
Yes, that will surely be interesting.
But see the Seattle Times report posted by Grebe above (around #3925)....
"next steps are..."........
“A separate, multiday simulator session with airline pilots to assess human factors and crew workload under various test conditions.”

Simulator .sessions are not the place to "assess human factors and crew workload". That needs to be done in a user lab. Simulators are for (no-risk) training. There is nothing to prove they accurately reflect a physical design – or can compensate for a poor one. Nor do they facilitate design failure reporting and analysis.

Is this a design or a training issue? I believe that Gums says that it is design.

Last edited by Outofthefray; 13th Nov 2019 at 14:47. Reason: spelling + grammar
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