Originally Posted by
gums
Salute!
Forgive me, but I am having a hard time with requiring hours of "training" for pilots to fly the MAX with the new MCAS, or even the old MCAS.
Seems to this old fart that letting all of we pilots know that 1) MCAS is installed and 2) is supposed to trim nose down when at a few degrees AoA below the stall and 3) it might trigger shortly after takeoff or even in the holding pattern if the AoA sensors go weird, and 4) turn off the trim and trouble shoot while returning to base if you wish.
I would personally like to fly the real plane without MCAS so I could feel the light back force, but I realize that such training might cost $$$$. Hell, I would like to fly the thing up to a stall/stick shaker AoA just to see if there was wing rock, strong buffet, etc. telling me that I was pressing the envelope.
My feeling is that Boeing and FAA thot failure to activate was more important then nuisance and fatal activation when a single sensor went south.
Gums sends...
On the face of it I would agree Gums, but, then the goal posts are being moved here as well. The community understands the system that was at the heart of the two accidents, but now we have a new, improved version, and presumably that removes the risks, however, it also potentially introduces new failure modes that have to be understood. To that end, a sound knowledge on the new system is important. Hopefully, the response is still exactly the same as it should have been, had the problem been recognised on the accident events. Recognition is key to dealing with the issue, as it has been since cavemen first discovered fire.