PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 11th Nov 2019, 01:43
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OldnGrounded
 
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Originally Posted by ktcanuck
I don't think it matters whether FCC(left) and your FCC(right) friend are 8086, 286, 386 or i7 core blah, when you, as one FCC, are called upon to figure out why your data differs from your only other friends data, you cannot tell whether you or they are right and you are screwed. Safely, you can only both shutdown. Now what?

If MCAS was needed for certification in either its initial or later severity of effect, I am at loss to see how airworthiness can be demonstrated without major changes.

But then I am older and not subject to modern economic influences....
You've nailed it. Two FCCs can't meaningfully vote on two AoA vanes, no matter how everything is configured. And the task of reconfiguration to get anywhere near an effective solution (maybe toss in a third, synthetic, AoA input) . . . well, how can that not mean an enormous testing and certification burden, followed by significant new training requirements?
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