Originally Posted by
Big Pistons Forever
Willow Run
I think you made my point for me. With all those agencies and bodies involved the chance for an impartial, fact and evidence driven, engineering focused root cause analysis is IMHO; just about nil
Instead stand by for paralysis by analysis as the vested interests come together to ensure any changes brief well at the press conference but effect no meaningful change......
It could be a lot easier to buy into the resigned tone or perhaps realistic-pessimism is more accurate as a description, rather than trying to identify positive dynamics and on that basis to advocate for more (or try to advocate).
Still, borrowing from OnG the observation that this type certificate grounding is unprecedented as a crisis (or words to that effect), and because there's so much riding on "what happens next", here's an effort. First, the SWAPA lawsuit, so far, has been noted for the claims for lost income against Boeing, claims not asserted in earlier groundings as far as I recall. Even more telling is how the fact-pleading complaint lays bare Boeing's strident insistence that the MAX is not a new type plus, how this very question was central to the SWAPA contract talks with their airline. I'm going on lawyerly instinct here maybe but look for this litigation to illustrate the old senior partner wisdom, "litigation has a way of focusing the mind." For its deception impacting the CBA situation, Boeing seems destined to be rewarded with a more forceful, uncompromising aviator community than....than what Ferris had to try to stare down at United, let's say.
Also, the status of how the certification process is structured legislatively, recently revamped as reported by the NYT just before the hearings, is like a tailor-made vehicle for the pols and press to keep the pressure on for reform. But that's going to require a longer time than a correction of the flaws in the MAX with respect to MCAS and (without claiming to understand the depth of systems and aeronautics detail) other characteristics (like, manuevering). Perhaps the correction of the systems config of 737 MAX can and should be done in two phases. But the comments that the NG variant could or does exhibit related vulnerabilities...perhaps two phases of system and config correction/upgrade can address this also. Followed by more fundamental restructure of the process and the engineering content in the FARs.
After the group of CAAs of other countries in the JATR put in the work needed to guide meaningful change, to accept a press event as solutions would be to cede aviation leadership - or what's left of it now - to somebody else. Aren't the stakes that high? And as today is a Sunday, I won't go on at length about Herb Kelleher turning over in his resting place, his airline's workhorse like some cheap aluminum can whose airworthiness can just be, like, kicked down the road.
There's no disagreeing that the realistic-pessimism viewpoint is solidly the way things are. But is the industry and its several communities - especially the pilots in their associations and as individuals - going to accept that? If I were a lawyer engaged in major aviation crash litigation work, I'd be braced for arguments that those 346 souls died in vain, or to argue why they did not. Actually, we'd better be able to cover both.