Gordon, reflecting on my previous thoughts; training as mitigation without system change would not now provide a satisfactory short term solution (for regulation).
Similarly, restrictive wt / cg, closely associated with stability, would be insufficient given the evolving understanding of the issue - or lack of understanding given the scarcity of public information or proposed solutions.
The runaway trim scenario for the NG is likely to be acceptable with knowledge of the back-stick trim cutout; although there should be more training for recovery from adverse trim conditions and awareness training for the multitude of unassociated alerts (distractions - workload) if other systems are involved.
The Max could similarly be credited with the existing back-stick cutout, but this would depend on the effect of any aerodynamic differences (NT to Max), residual trim force, and ability to use manual trim.
A speculative view is that a hardened version of MCAS will be retained for the high speed stability issues, but for low speed further changes could be anticipated depending on the nature of the problems - stability, stall awareness, stall identification.
A view with hindsight is generally easier. However, as more information surfaces it appears that the knowledge with hindsight was available during the initial certification - foresight, but misjudged / misused. Furthermore, with rejection of the initial modification proposals we might conclude that misjudgement - misuse of that knowledge was still considered to be a short term (but permanent) solution.
Some people had the required knowledge, but not all having an adequate understanding for applying that knowledge, others influenced by commercial priorities or ‘external forces’.