It is now apparent that the bottom line on this whole debacle is pretty simple.
If MCAS stayed as first specified then there very likely would have been no crashes as it was not powerful enough to overcome an elevator up input. This in my opinion could even justify it not being included in pilot operational documentation.
However this initial cheap and easy work around to make the airplane conform to the certification requirements did not work.
So at this point Boeing could have
1) Investigate another fix for the issue like for instance, aerodynamic modifications to the engine nacelles to reduce their lift at high AOA, or
2) Revisited a more powerful MCAS solution including a full safety case review which would have driven sensor redundancy, additional pilot documentation, revised emergency checklist procedures etc etc
I think it is unfortunate that everyone at Boeing and the FAA is not totally focused on the root causes that resulted in the above two choices not being actioned
Instead we seem to have a situation where the priority is butt covering for Boeing and the FAA and, grandstanding from other authorities.
i understand that this is an inevitable reality in today’s business and political environment, but it is too bad we are wasting a huge opportunity to reset a broken certification and oversight regime from first principles.