Future Carrier (Including Costs)

[Engines]

Dear All,

Thank you for your positive comments - it's nice to know that my posts help a little here and there. Also thank to those who responded with their posts - exchange of ideas is always a good thing. I'd like to respond to those, and hopefully help the thread along.

LO raises the very good examples of Rafale and the F-111 as aircraft designed from the outset to be both CTOL (land based) and CV (cat and trap carrier based). The F-111B CV variant proved to be unsuccessful, and when I worked at Fort Worth it was frequently quoted as an example of how not to put an aircraft to sea. It couldn't 'thread the needle' of being able to get a reasonable payload off the catapult (very high empty weight) or get back on board at a feasible speed (not enough wing). It shows what an excellent job the French made with Rafale, although I would like to know just how common the airframes are between the land based variants and the 'M'.

The reason I mention that is to pick up on LO's point about empty weights, and the effect on them of going STOVL. He is absolutely right that the empty weight of the F-35B is higher than that of the F-35A, and he is also right that the 'B' has to carry around the weight of the equipment to get it on and off the ship. However, I would gently point out that the F-35C also carries some weight to allow it to use the launch and recovery gear (the cats and traps) on the ship. Using the 'empty weight' figures from the 2016 OT&E report, the three variants come out as follows (figures slightly rounded to make the mental maths easier):

F-35A - 29,000 pounds
F-35B - 32,400 pounds
F-35C - 34,580 pounds

From these, the F-35B's 'STOVL weight penalty' is around 3,400 pounds, The F-35C, however, has a weigh penalty of 5,580 pounds. This is due to the factors I highlighted in an earlier reply, where the unique loads generated by cat and trap operations generate massive additional stresses that have to be managed by additional or much beefier bits of metal. The F-35C also has to have larger wings, fins and tailplanes to be able to do that slow precision approach and landing stuff as well as flying away from a catapult launch. Plus a landing gear system that weighs well over twice that of an A. These all add many pounds. The designers I worked with told me that the 'C' model was the least 'common' of the three variants. I freely admit that this isn't a straight comparison - those bigger wings on the 'C' do translate into increased internal fuel capacity and longer range. However, they also mean lower speeds and reduced turn performance - the 'C' model bleeds energy in the turn faster than the A or the B. Horses for courses, as ever. By the way, the 'C' also lacks an internal gun and has, I can assure you all, a very aggressively lightened structure, just like the other two variants.

To pick up on LO's last point - yes, STOVL does let you operate from smaller ships. I can't quite follow the rest of his argument (which is my fault, not his), but I would gently offer the observation that the USMC have a bit of a handle on what they are doing (just like the USAF, the USN, the RAF, the RN and other F-35 operators) and they are not putting 12 or 13 F-35Bs on an LHA and sending it out east for the look of the thing.

As an engineer, I would not want to get too far into CONOPs matters such as raised by Easy Street. I do think, though, that he raises a valid point about UK F-35 force structure, and the fact that we are planning for an 'all B' force with consequent effect on our F-35 ops from land bases. I've previously posted my opinion that a split A/B force could be a better option for the UK. There is quite a bit of commonality between the A and the B, especially where many of the normal support related costs drivers apply (e.g. training, avionics spares and sustainment, systems components), and a split A/B force, working off a common training and support system would, in my view, be worth looking at. Along with that, I would suggest that the 'Forward' A and B aircraft could then be returned to their proper Force Command HQs (Air and Sea), thus restoring the proper chains of responsibility for operational development and not least air safety responsibilities.

Finally, (and sorry for the long post) a gentle reminder (at least from my addled memory) of the CVF/F-35 historical relationship and SDR 2010. The F-35B STOVL variant was, up to that time, the UK's focus, coming out of the initial Naval Air Staff Target for a Sea Harrier replacement to operate from 'Invincible' class ships, and also because STOVL expertise was the UK's main bargaining chip to get full 'Tier 1' partner status on the JSF programme. (The formal UK/US document that got the UK on to JSF was actually titled the 'STOVL MoU'). However, from the outset, the UK wanted to keep all options open for the CVF future carrier, and mandated a ship large enough to be converted to cat and trap. This led to two very large carriers, almost as big as the USN's 'Forrestal', which was the first of the 'super carriers'. This decision was also influenced by the view (not at all wrong) that much smaller carriers (like the 20,000 ton Invincibles) suffered from serious constraints on internal space for fuel, weapons and hangarage. However, with over 40 years' since the last time anyone in the UK had tried to design a ship of this class and size, the MoD had a few gaps in their technical expertise, especially at higher levels.

That mattered, because when SDR 2010 came around (and I know quite a few people of all 3 services who tell me that the 2010 SDR was one of the most fouled up Defence Reviews of all time), the problems the F-35B was then having caused what I can only call a 'panic'. This led to high priced people in Mod Main deciding that the UK should go 'cat and trap' - after all, how hard could it be to convert the (already designed) CVF? They'd watched the spiffing Carrier Alliance videos showing how you could just peel off the deck and install the cats, after all. I know for a fact that this decision was taken without input from the Carrier team - the two star in charge was given under 48 hours (over a weekend) to come up with the costs to justify the decision.

In the event, when reality dawned, including the actual state of progress on EMALS at that time and the complexity of a conversion of CVF back to cat and trap (NWSRG is exactly right when he calls it 'open heart surgery'), the decision was reversed in 2012, I think. Was it the right decision to go back to STOVL? Time will tell, but I think (my view only) it was. When you start to add up the real costs of operating an effectively sized cat and trap fleet of aircraft including the need for tankers (not so much for strike range, but as essential safety measures to refuel aircraft waiting to recover while a fouled deck is cleared), the long range AEW, special personnel to man and operate and repair the cat and trap gear, the training load for the pilots, and so on, I honestly believe that the UK can't get into that game and do it properly. It's only the USN that can do it, at present. But hey, I'm just an old engineer.

Thanks to all those who have helped this become such an informative and enjoyable thread. And who have put up so kindly with my ramblings. I'll go quiet now for a bit.

Best regards as ever to our young men and women who are out right there now on land and at sea working hard and professionally to give the UK the defence capability it needs and deserves.

Engines