No technical news, but provides a broad context to the MAX story. Worth reading:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hershsh...greek-tragedy/
Boeing’s CEO Dennis Muilenburg, is spending this week on Capitol Hill testifying before a series of Congressional committees about the failures related to the 737 MAX. The saga of the 737 MAX is akin to a classic Greek tragedy featuring heroes with tragic flaws, along with a host of general lessons.
This week, much attention is being paid to the culture at Boeing, especially its willingness to focus on profit at the expense of safety. Doing so is instructive, especially if we identify the broader psychological issues that impacted Boeing’s decision makers and which apply to decision makers at many firms.
The broad issues pertain to Boeing decision makers’ mindsets as they faced strong competitive pressures from Airbus. In part, this pressure arose because Boeing executives were late to recognize the Airbus threat, partly because of their own hubris. In particular, Boeing executives failed to put controls in place in order to manage normal human tendencies that people face when they feel themselves to be operating in the domain of losses. These human tendencies involve the inclination to take imprudent risks in an attempt to avoid having to accept a sure loss. Just as unsuccessful racetrack bettors tend to back long shots late in the day, in the hope of breaking even, Boeing took risks with the 737 MAX by cutting corners, in an effort to avoid having to cede the market to Airbus.
Lying at the root of the behavior patterns described in the previous paragraph are a small number of psychological phenomena. The list includes excessive optimism, overconfidence, and confirmation bias: optimism for underestimating the probability of commercial airline pilots being able to deal with MCAS problems, overconfidence about the risks attached to allowing for a single point of failure, and confirmation bias by downplaying the problem after two 737 MAX planes had crashed.
Aversion to accepting a sure loss, excessive optimism, overconfidence, and confirmation bias are general phenomena that impact many organizations. Boeing’s experience is currently under scrutiny, but it is hardly unique. The firm’s missteps serve as a cautionary warning for all firms facing strong competitive pressures about the need to practice prudent risk management.