Originally Posted by
ST Dog
Wasn't trying to be snarky. Just wondering. My experience with safety analyses for aircraft systems and ARP4761 and ARP4754A colors my comments.
I've seen a lot of comments here that lead me to believe posters have little knowledge of how safety assessments are done or what the certification process is like..
No, never worked for Boeing though I have some experience with one Boeing aircraft.
Never dealt with management.
Staying within the non-attribution lane I'll just say I'm on the airworthiness authority side of things.
I disagree that "Schedule- Budget- and retraining" were the reason MCAS was classified as Major vs some higher severity.
I think the process, used across the industry, would have ended up at the same severity with other OEs.
Those three may have colored the path taken, by limiting options explored in engineering, and led to looking for a solution that was of a lower severity, but I don't think the process was pencil whipped to reach an outcome of Major.
OK- While you are free to disagree re my " Schedule- Budget- and retraining" comments and " no pencil whipping " I suggest that UNLESS one has worked at Boeing in the areas under discussion, and despite the current- (Yesterday and today 30 Oct) hearings and the continuing ducking and dodging of the " profit uber alles " ( my shorthand version of what/why MCAS implementation was fubar- with the help of FAA )-comparison to other companies and/or equivalent safety analysis methods only covers a small part of the real issues.
I'll try to cover in simple- sparse examples just why the " we encourage those with safety concerns to speak up, no retaliation - new reporting guidelines, etc " is no more than business buzzword
PR, then ( years ago ) and now - because I personally have lived and worked those kind of items at Boeing. I have munged a bit the dates and identifying items, but the overall issues as described below are real, not hearsay or myth or similar.
1) Time- late 80's-early 90's. CEO at that time was Frank Shrontz. Frank made a major effort to arrange for anyone to contact him about any issue and provided absolute assurances of no retaliation, etc. In casual discussions of several people ( engineers and shop ) I worked with, the most common response to a received- random offer to meet with Frank was turned down- due to fear installed by their local supervisor or manager. I doubt things have since changed, or will change.
2) When a shop or engineering or clerical person was invited (again at random) to attend a paid for breakfast with other random chosen workers and the Program manager with appropriate charge number exclusions- the results varied from Shop supervisor telling such person IF he attended- he would be terminated, to the opposite wherein said person when asked by program manager what was on his/her mind- they literally stood on the table on told said manager exactly what manager should do relative to xyz issue and methods and communication. The result was that said grunt was invited to a special group to help figure out and implement appropriate corrections, suggestions, etc. Said manager commented to me much later his observations. IF when he asked the ' first or second ' person to speak up, AND that person essentially read the manager the ' riot act ' fairly politely, the rest of the meeting went well and he got lots of good feedback. But if no such person spoke up with anything non complementary, not much feedback would ensue for the rest of the meeting.
3) Supervisors and Managers at all levels had/have two distinct traits. One was if there was a problem,they were helped and encouraged to take it as high as felt necessary to get an answer. The other group was of the IF you communicate to any member of management above " me" without MY knowledge or direct approval or permission- you are on my S** list in MY organization.
4) In one specific example on a ' secure ' program where in to get into shop area required special ID, etc the following happened. The program manager rarely visited that area for a variety of good reasons, but had heard of some abusive and unsafe work practices. So late one night in a 'factory' he put on some old wok clothes, and unannounced went thru security check in and wandered thru the factory. stopped to talk to a ' janitor ' with a casual conversation,etc. About one minute later, a shop worker came around a corner, saw the two standing and talking and obviously not ' working '. went up to them, said ' break it up, we just heard the program manager is in the building, and he has been known to fire anyone obviously not working- spread the word ' So much for that evening.
Lastly- I know several current workers and/or recent retirees who will agree things have not really changed thru this year and may have gotten worse.
But the
PR-legal buzzwords re ' open door' 'no retaliation' re org changes etc still sell well to the outsiders
+++++ Late edit +++
Mentioned above Frank Shrontz - in the late 80's- early 90's, Boeing hit a rough patch for various reasons- Frank turned down his board approved raise at the shareholders meeting.
Today- mullenberg refused to answer that question- but deferred to whatever the board decided which under the rules- would probalby NOT include a bonus due to prior -current process involving 'profit and earning' lack.
Just re-inforces the culture of 'profit uber alles ' infection. Granted he should stay until MAX is back in service, etc- but he could have easily promised to forgo any bonus, raise, options, etc that may accrue.
So much for his and Boeings ' I'm sorry' meme