Originally Posted by
Australopithecus
*As an aside, I asked for a failed alpha vane on my last NG simulator take-off. The simulator (CAE, 737-800) did not have that as a menu option, so the best they could do was a blocked pitot tube. The resulting stick shaker, UAS, windshear warning was very busy and distracting. I remain astonished that Boeing thought that adding an undocumented, intermittent, fast, stab trim input would not trip the crews into cognitive and manipulation overload.
I was astonished to read, in the report quoted by Grebe, that
"Boeing engineers seemed to realize they had underestimated MCAS's ability to push the plane's nose down forcefully and repeatedly, and overestimated how pilots would respond, said a person familiar with the FAA's response."
**IF TRUE** this would indicate that even Boeing didn't know how effective MCAS was.
It is also striking how often the report repeats that FAA experts struggled to understand the intricacies of MCAS, and yet continued to sanction the delivery of an AD as a risk control for a system that air crew were not being informed of nor trained for.