PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 29th Oct 2019, 00:45
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pilot9250
 
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Originally Posted by Tomaski
I will again make the observation that, with the exception of a single MCAS cycle (after which the crew extended the flaps) the ONLY malfunction that this crew was dealing with for the first five minutes was a malfunctioning AOA sensor. That's it. Almost all of the confusing elements that presented themselves during that time could happen TODAY on any 737NG currently flying. These things can happen again on every MAX once they are flying again. Every. Single. One. None of the proposed remedies changes this reality.

No, the crew shouldn't be buried in the checklist. They should perform the memory items and fly the aircraft to a safe altitude where they can stabilize the aircraft, prioritize their actions, and then run the appropriate checklists. That did not happen.

Forget MCAS for the moment. This crew was not well-prepared to handle the AOA malfunction and subsequent warnings, annunciations and divergent instrument readings. They were not prepared because they were never properly trained to handle this malfunction even though it was, in theory, a high priority memory item procedure. There has been a massive training failure, and it has occurred at airlines across the board. Yet, has anything really changed in this regard since these accidents? Among the 737NG pilot community that participates here, I would ask if any of you have seen any significant changes in your company's training regime that would better prepare you for an AOA malfunction on takeoff? I've seen nothing at my airline.

Unfortunately the discussion around MCAS and Boeing's liability tends to suck most of the oxygen out of the room when examining these tragic events. There are other lessons here, and I'm greatly concerned that those lessons are going to be lost because so many people are looking at the bright shining object that is known as MCAS.
All you wrote is that if MCAS didn't exist they would have been flying NG.

And NG doesn't have this failure mode, these fatalities or this accident rate.

That adding runaway trim to all the other conditions, concurrently, put the crew over the edge.

And that MCAS caused that and needs to be fixed.

Which curiously enough is exactly what's happening.

Last edited by pilot9250; 29th Oct 2019 at 01:32.
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