AoA disagree messages might be useful in some scenarios, but when presented with a sole stick shaker on take-off it would be pretty obvious five seconds later that if you were still climbing normally that the alpha vane was providing bad information. (And hence in disagreement with both the wing and the other vane). A useful thing AoA disagree could have done was disable the MCAS, but of course it wasn’t so designed.
Sensor faults inappropriately triggering built-in protections have caused Airbus accidents too, and they have since developed procedures for stall warning on take-off (for example). Boeing does not provide a similar memory procedure, relying instead on the unreliable airspeed procedure. If a safety feature like pitch feel augmentation, or alpha floor, or overspeed is going to be a part of the plane then they deserve very robust sensor reliability and redundancy. Otherwise the protective features give you one last lesson in irony while they kill you.