The KNKT Report on LNI 610 appears to have captured the general issues effectively, and given the amount of politics that exists in the background that is a good outcome. It is curious that the prior flight's (LNI 043) involvement of dead heading crew has not been indicated beyond a reference on page 210, para 53 of the Conclusions. That would have reinforced the workload concerns that are raised in the report so is curious.
The report pertinently raises that assumptions of crew response to a failure can be at variance to the real world. The body fo evidence from accident and serious incidents would support that hypothesis. Observing crew performance in a simulator one of the striking observations is the extent of variability that occurs. Watching crews dealing with real malfunctions in the real world appear to show an even greater variation occurs in the real world than in simulation. Lockheed a long time back altered their abnormal and emergency response to a read and do for all (or as many as the regulator would permit), which seemed rational. Reliance on explicit timely responses by humans is at odds with historical human performance, whether being police making split second irreversible decisions, nuclear engineers, doctors or pilots. recent headlines would suggest that would include attorneys and former mayors as well. These assumptions impinge on the analysis as made in CP13471, Revision AH. LNI's input to the draft report also appear to be reasonable.