Some nuggets to post:
1. Another documentary by Chris Terrill coming up. I expect it will also be on BBC iPlayer.
2.
F-35B fully loaded
Loaded on to this state-of-the-art jet from 17 (Test and Evaluation) is the weaponry it would typically carry on a strike mission: 22,000lb of destructive and defensive power.
n this case the ‘bombheads’ on HMS Queen Elizabeth – red-surcout-wearing air engineer technicians – carefully loaded inert Paveway laser-guided bombs and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles (for taking out aerial threats) on to the external pylons and bomb bay.
Fully-loaded, it’s known as “beast mode” by crews because of the firepower it delivers – nearly three times more than a Harrier, and as much as the heaviest payload carried by a WW2 Lancaster bomber (a Grand Slam or ‘earthquake’ bomb.
3.
Junglies at the heart of the Carrier Strike Group
During Westlant, off the east coast of the United States, the Commando Merlin pilots and aircrew’s day to day work involves them flying stores around the Carrier Strike Group’s (CSG) warships and ashore, keeping everything ticking over on the mammoth operation.
In the old CVS days - how many sorties by the nine ASW Sea Kings onboard would be utility roles such as HDS or VERTREP? If freed of these tasks, does a squadron of six Merlin HM2 provide the same level of ASW coverage as nine Sea King HAS 5/6 - considering things like the increased range and endurance, and the much more capable radar and sonics?
4. I found this Corbett Paper online - I cannot recall having seen it before:
The interoperability of future UK air power, afloat and ashore: a historical analysis
Points to note:
a. To make carrier aviation viable, the aircraft have to get used to embarking and the carrier has to be up to speed with having jets aboard.
b. V/STOL makes it possible for aircraft not solely dedicated to carry operations to embark.
c. Even a V/STOL aircraft needs to be designed or modified to operate from a ship.
d. Post Falklands, nobody thought of a Joint RN/RAF force until the nineties.
e. The
Invincible class carriers were busy in the Adriatic in the early nineties, and later in the late nities and beyond in the Gulf - and RAF Harriers joining the Sea Harriers.
f. The loss of Sea Harrier meant having jets embarked less often, meaning the carriers' personnel lost skills.
g. In 1982 the RAF Harrier GR3 had been able to embark aboard
Hermes as she was used to having Sea Harrier aboard and fully up to speed with supporting fixed wing aircraft.
h. Points a to g were ignored by Cameron prior to SDSR 10. The STOVL-CV-STOVL debacle did is no favours and the politics made mitigating the loss of having our own jets on deck a lot harder than it would have been. This is one of the things I highlighted from that article - the embarkation of 1 Sqn with Harrier GR3 aboard HMS
Hermes in 1982 and the embarkation of Harrier GR7 in the nineties was only possible as the carrier was fully swept up with having fixed wing aircraft embarked.F-35B was the correct choice, perhaps the only choice given the way the UK intends to operate a joint force and one that is not solely carrier based. It also means no need for catapults or arresting gear, and the manpower needed for them.
Theoretical best is often the enemy of good enough AND feasible.
It would be interesting to see a documentary covering
all the measures taken to maintain and recover skills, but think it very unlikely - not everything is public. Sometimes there were
hints, sometimes one heard rumours and made logical deductions...