Whilst I agree with what you say, I would like to add the following:
Most of the worlds NAA's do not train "outside the box". Companies see the cost of training as "expensive" which reduces their overall profit, per the bean counters, thus reducing quality training time. This reduction fails to address proper system knowledge and procedures, an important aspect in operating a commercial jet aircraft.
Years ago Boeing reduced the "training footprint" in reaction to Airbus's training footprint!
The crew of the fatal flight had many different caution messages and warnings.
1) Stall warning
2) IAS disagree
3) Elevator feel
and so on.
So what checklist, would they run and what was covered during their transition course?
Most NAA's adopt the Boeing type rating course and tailor the course to the requirements of their respective NAA's (not FAA) to meet the standard for issuance of the type rating.
The adopted "Boeing" course covers "runaway stabilizer" and "airspeed unreliable" (without stall warnings, feel diff, IAS disagree etc). During the transition course stalls and UPRT are part of the type course but are not included with other cautions and warnings, such as the accident crew were faced with. Current flight simulators are basically programmed to a level which covers basic malfunctions, so any "deeper" system integrated faults attached to other systems cannot be selected by the Instructor.
The crew had no exposure in training to all of the other cautions and warnings (that they received during the flight) during their initial (transition) course.
Question: if you are faced with an IAS disagree at "say 200 ft agl" ( there is a memory item for this) why would you retract flaps and accelerate? MCAS wouldn't even come into play. Not defending manufacturer or controlling agency. In my very humble opinion even Sully's most appreciated comments are not appropriate.
Last edited by Flapsupbedsdown; 26th Oct 2019 at 18:48.