Originally Posted by
Tomaski
I will again make the observation that, with the exception of a single MCAS cycle (after which the crew extended the flaps) the ONLY malfunction that this crew was dealing with for the first five minutes was a malfunctioning AOA sensor. That's it. Almost all of the confusing elements that presented themselves during that time could happen TODAY on any 737NG currently flying. These things can happen again on every MAX once they are flying again. Every. Single. One. None of the proposed remedies changes this reality.
No, the crew shouldn't be buried in the checklist. They should perform the memory items and fly the aircraft to a safe altitude where they can stabilize the aircraft, prioritize their actions, and then run the appropriate checklists. That did not happen.
Forget MCAS for the moment. This crew was not well-prepared to handle the AOA malfunction and subsequent warnings, annunciations and divergent instrument readings. They were not prepared because they were never properly trained to handle this malfunction even though it was, in theory, a high priority memory item procedure. There has been a massive training failure, and it has occurred at airlines across the board. Yet, has anything really changed in this regard since these accidents? Among the 737NG pilot community that participates here, I would ask if any of you have seen any significant changes in your company's training regime that would better prepare you for an AOA malfunction on takeoff? I've seen nothing at my airline.
Unfortunately the discussion around MCAS and Boeing's liability tends to suck most of the oxygen out of the room when examining these tragic events. There are other lessons here, and I'm greatly concerned that those lessons are going to be lost because so many people are looking at the bright shining object that is known as MCAS.
Whilst I agree with what you say, I would like to add the following:
Most of the worlds NAA's do not train "outside the box". Companies see the cost of training as "expensive" which reduces their overall profit, per the bean counters, thus reducing quality training time. This reduction fails to address proper system knowledge and procedures, an important aspect in operating a commercial jet aircraft.
Years ago Boeing reduced the "training footprint" in reaction to Airbus's training footprint!
The crew of the fatal flight had many different caution messages and warnings.
1) Stall warning
2) IAS disagree
3) Elevator feel
and so on.
So what checklist, would they run and what was covered during their transition course?
Most NAA's adopt the Boeing type rating course and tailor the course to the requirements of their respective NAA's (not FAA) to meet the standard for issuance of the type rating.
The adopted "Boeing" course covers "runaway stabilizer" and "airspeed unreliable" (without stall warnings, feel diff, IAS disagree etc). During the transition course stalls and UPRT are part of the type course but are not included with other cautions and warnings, such as the accident crew were faced with. Current flight simulators are basically programmed to a level which covers basic malfunctions, so any "deeper" system integrated faults attached to other systems cannot be selected by the Instructor.
The crew had no exposure in training to all of the other cautions and warnings (that they received during the flight) during their initial (transition) course.