Originally Posted by
Loose rivets
Having read in for nearly a year, I'm ever increasingly flummoxed by some of the basic operating philosophies I'm reading here. In a 'Crowd of pilots', many of whom are current on the NG, there seems to be a discussion about reading the printed word in the midst of a flight which had quickly become chaotic. Most agree it was a very demanding slew of symptoms that would have been nothing less than alarming, but I can not begin to imagine reaching for check-lists in the midst of the early stages as though it would have been some kind of cure-all. But that pales in comparison to handing over the flying to a junior FO under these circumstances.
For months, there seemed to be a consensus about Pitch and Power, but now some seem to be saying that reaching for the right check-list would have been the answer to such wildly disparate challenges. I feel the symptoms were initially too confusing to go down any predefined logic-line. The 'Aviate' phase was a crescendo of disorientating psychological demands. The FO makes a good call with the first of the symptoms. The furthest ASI is what, 20" away? The next, perfectly visible.
Given that the aircraft was quickly becoming difficult to fly and the prime cause for that seemed to them that the STS was working in reverse . . . just what check-list would they be aiming for? I have a very strong feeling that there was no sensible time to work through Unreliable Airspeed, and it was after all, not all that high on the list.
It's fair to say that the pilots were presented with a set of symptoms that no civil aircrew should be burdened with, but with this comes the prime issue of co-pilot experience. It is being addressed, but I would suggest that it join other issues on a top priority list.
I will again make the observation that, with the exception of a single MCAS cycle (after which the crew extended the flaps) the ONLY malfunction that this crew was dealing with for the first five minutes was a malfunctioning AOA sensor. That's it. Almost all of the confusing elements that presented themselves during that time could happen TODAY on any 737NG currently flying. These things can happen again on every MAX once they are flying again. Every. Single. One. None of the proposed remedies changes this reality.
No, the crew shouldn't be buried in the checklist. They should perform the memory items and fly the aircraft to a safe altitude where they can stabilize the aircraft, prioritize their actions, and then run the appropriate checklists. That did not happen.
Forget MCAS for the moment. This crew was not well-prepared to handle the AOA malfunction and subsequent warnings, annunciations and divergent instrument readings.
They were not prepared because they were never properly trained to handle this malfunction even though it was, in theory, a high priority memory item procedure. There has been a massive training failure, and it has occurred at airlines across the board. Yet, has anything really changed in this regard since these accidents? Among the 737NG pilot community that participates here, I would ask if any of you have seen any significant changes in your company's training regime that would better prepare you for an AOA malfunction on takeoff? I've seen nothing at my airline.
Unfortunately the discussion around MCAS and Boeing's liability tends to suck most of the oxygen out of the room when examining these tragic events. There are other lessons here, and I'm greatly concerned that those lessons are going to be lost because so many people are looking at the bright shining object that is known as MCAS.