Having read in for nearly a year, I'm ever increasingly flummoxed by some of the basic operating philosophies I'm reading here. In a 'Crowd of pilots', many of whom are current on the NG, there seems to be a discussion about reading the printed word in the midst of a flight which had quickly become chaotic. Most agree it was a very demanding slew of symptoms that would have been nothing less than alarming, but I can not begin to imagine reaching for check-lists in the midst of the early stages as though it would have been some kind of cure-all. But that pales in comparison to handing over the flying to a junior FO under these circumstances.
For months, there seemed to be a consensus about Pitch and Power, but now some seem to be saying that reaching for the right check-list would have been the answer to such wildly disparate challenges. I feel the symptoms were initially too confusing to go down any predefined logic-line. The 'Aviate' phase was a crescendo of disorientating psychological demands. The FO makes a good call with the first of the symptoms. The furthest ASI is what, 20" away? The next, perfectly visible.
Given that the aircraft was quickly becoming difficult to fly and the prime cause for that seemed to them that the STS was working in reverse . . . just what check-list would they be aiming for? I have a very strong feeling that there was no sensible time to work through Unreliable Airspeed, and it was after all, not all that high on the list.
It's fair to say that the pilots were presented with a set of symptoms that no civil aircrew should be burdened with, but with this comes the prime issue of co-pilot experience. It is being addressed, but I would suggest that it join other issues on a top priority list.