Originally Posted by
Takwis
I'll try again, Tomaski, as right above me is a perfect example of what I am talking about. You detail the steps of the Airspeed Unreliable checklist as being "an important aid in dealing with this malfunction". Ian W says that "if followed", the Runaway Stab Trim checklist "would have prevented the Ethiopian crash". For a while, there were two factions of pilots (call them what you wish), with one group advocating one checklist, and the other group arguing for the other checklist. At times, Boeing spokesmen said that one was the solution, and at other times, to include the AD, insisting that the other was the one to follow. My point is that if a crowd of pilots and engineers sitting at their computers cannot make up their mind which was the proper checklist to use...if Boeing vacillated over time between the two as more facts were brought up, how can anyone expect even a well trained crew to make the "right" decision, hundreds of feet above the ground in an aircraft marginally in control?
If the airspeed checklist was followed then you'd be in a better position to maintain control, especially before flaps-up.
Once past that, or if not done at all, executing the runaway stab check list, before trim got way out, would have stopped unwanted trim allowing for recovery.
The Captain kept MCAS in check a long time. It was only when he handed off to the FO that it got out of hand.
The report faulted the Captain for a poor handover, not explaining what the plane was doing or what he was doing to counter. The FO for whatever reason did not instinctively trim against MCAS like the Captain did. (Or like both pilots on JTI043).