Originally Posted by
Tomaski
Within four seconds of liftoff, the FO correctly pointed out the "IAS Disagree" annunciation. Less than a minute later, the Captain instructed the FO to perform the memory items for Airspeed Unreliable (why the CA couldn't do it himself is beyond me).
I recall that the airline procedures were for the PM (FO here) to do the memory items/checklists while the PF flies the plane.
There was also commentary about the Captain not controlling the crew well and that the FO had notes about not knowing memory items and having trouble finding/executing checklists.
I think that it is entirely reasonable to speculate that if the crew had gotten to this point with a stable aircraft, a stable pitch and power setting, no F/D instructing them to dive, and no overspeed clacker, then yes, they may well have just handled any MCAS activation better.
Quite likely to have engaged the trim cutouts like the previous crew did.