The issue with the checklists is that none of the proposed checklists actually involve identifying and resolving the problem. The fault was a sensor/software error in an automatic system that could not be deactivated. Every proposed "if only they had done this..." solution involves actions that would have only coincidentally reset or disabled MCAS, a system about which they knew nothing. Even the runaway trim checklist did not disable MCAS, it was still waiting offstage to take charge if the electric trim happened to be turned back on. (And I note that even the runaway trim checklist is not the correct solution, since a true runaway trim would involve turning off the electric trim as soon as possible rather than attempting to use it to correct the erroneous stabilizer inputs.)
Reading the CVR brings this point home in a very painful and tragic way. The pilots were following a checklist that they thought would help, but ultimately all that it did was to distract them from the real problem. There might be a larger safety issue here but I'm not quite sure how to express it.