Originally Posted by
JustinHeywood
According to Harris, bombing could win the war by flattening the major cities (area bombing). People promoting precision targets were just ‘panacea merchants’.
As an aside though, people (including Hastings) are apt to criticise Harris’ faith in area bombing. But up until fairly late in the war, area bombing was all that could realistically be achieved with the aircraft and nav. technology available.
Perhaps Harris’ major sin was that he refused to pay even lip service to a precision bombing strategy, as other air forces did.
In 1942, the realistic alternatives for Bomber Command were area bombing or no bombing. By 1944, much more focused bombing (not necessarily precise, but with targets more selective than a city) was possible. The case against Harris is that he persisted in area bombing rather than recognising that possibilities had changed. It was a virtue in Harris that he did not try to cover up or beautify the area bombing policy, which had been adopted by others before he was in command, and to which at the time there was no realistic alternative. The case against him is that he persisted in that policy even after more directed targeting was possible, that he did so to the point of insubordination (it is a question why he was not sacked), and that he did so partly to demonstrate the power of an air force as the critical independent strategic power, rather than to win the war as quickly as possible.
One interesting point to emerge from Hastings' book is that the crews involved in Chastise, the best known precision bombing operation of the war, were not untroubled by the very large number of civilian casualties it caused. In the circumstance of the time, even "precision" bombing would inevitably kill many civilians, and the case against Harris's policy was not that he was blood-thirsty, but bloody-minded.